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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
NUISANCE-PERMANENT DAMAGES AWARDED IN LIEU OF AN INJUNC-
TION WHERE RESULTANT DAMAGE FROM NUISANCE WAS SUBSTANTIAL
Defendant operates a large cement plant near Albany, New York, in
which he has invested $45,000,000 and which employs approximately 800
people. Plaintiffs are neighboring land owners alleging injury to their prop-
erty from dirt, smoke, and vibrations emanating from the plant. Their
action is for an injunction to restrain the defendant from maintaining a
nuisance and to recover damages sustained to their properties up to time of
trial. At the trial court permanent damages, as a possible basis of settlement,
were set at $185,000-the reduction in the fair market value of the plaintiffs'
land since the construction of the plant in 1962.1 The court found that
although the defendant's cement making operation created a nuisance and
damaged the properties of the plaintiffs, the damage was relatively small
in comparison to the value of the defendant's operation. The injunction
was denied and temporary damages were awarded in the event that the
stipulated permanent damages would not be accepted. The Appellate Di-
vision affirmed the trial court's decision.2 The Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded the case to determine permanent damages. Held, where the
economic consequences from the effect of a nuisance are relatively small
in comparison to the economic consequences from the effect of an injunc-
tion, the plaintiffs will not be granted an injunction if the defendant
company pays the plaintiffs permanent damages. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Company, Inc., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).3
Generally, injunctions are issued not as a matter of right, but in the
discretion of the court.4 It has been traditionally recognized, however, that
where a nuisance exists which causes substantial and irreparable injury
to nearby property owners, for which there is no adequate remedy at law,
the injured owners, as a matter of right, are entitled to injunctive relief.6
Two limitations on this doctrine of injunction as a matter of right have
developed. First, where the public depends upon the operation of a business
creating a nuisance, the courts have shown reluctance to grant injunctive
1. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 55 Misc. 2d 1023, 287 N.Y,S.2d 112
(Sup. Ct. 1967).
2. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 30 App. Div. 2d 480, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452
(3d Dep't 1968).
3. Hereinafter referred to as the instant case.
4. Nann v. Raimist, 255 N.Y. 307, 174 N.E. 690 (1931); Gray v. Manhattan Ry., 128
N.Y. 499, 28 N.E. 498 (1891).
5. Garvey v. Long Island R.R., 159 N.Y. 323, 54 N.E. 57 (1899); Campbell v. Sea-
man, 63 N.Y. 568 (1876); Little Falls Fibre Co. v. Henry Ford & Son. Inc., 126 Misc. 126,
212 N.Y.S. 630 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
RECENT CASES
relief.6 The courts will consider the public interest as well as the private
interest of the parties in the litigation. 7 The other limitation upon relief as
a matter of right is the doctrine of comparative injury.8 In determining the
propriety of injunctive relief, courts have weighed the probability of hard-
ship to both parties to determine the inherent equities and if much greater
injury will result from the issuance of an injunction than by its denial,
such relief will be denied. In Haber v. Paramount Ice Corporation,9 the
court employed such a weighing system to deny an injunction. The plain-
tiff, who lived next door to the defendant's ice manufacturing company,
alleged injury to his premises, to his family's health, and deprivation of
the peaceful enjoyment of his home from the defendant's incessant noises
and vibrations. The defendant had erected buildings and machinery costing
$550,000 and during trial had expended $14,000 more to install new ap-
pliances of the most modem and approved type aimed at abating the
nuisance. It was held that an inequitable result would follow the granting
of a permanent injunction, and the court would fix a sum as permanent
damages, giving the defendant the option of paying the sum or accepting
the injunction. Thus, based upon the doctrine of comparative injury, the
court in its discretion, may also deny injunctive relief and grant permanent
damages for a continuing nuisance.10
In Whelan v. Union Bag and Paper Co.," the doctrine of comparative
injury was limited to cases where the injury was not substantial. There
the defendant owned and operated a pulp mill representing an invest-
ment of more than $1,000,000 and employed between 400 and 500
workers from the community. Plaintiff, a "lower riparian owner" of a
farm, was injured by defendant's polluting of a stream to the extent
of $100 per year. The court considered such damage as substantial
and explained that "non-substantial" or "trivial" means inherently so
rather than comparatively so. The court, granting an injunction, stated
"[a]lthough the damage to the plaintiff may be slight as compared with the
defendant's expense of abating the condition, that is not a good reason
6. E.g., Schwartzenbach v. Oneonta Light & Power Co., 144 App. Div. 884, 129
N.Y.S. 384 (3d Dep't 1911), aff'd on other grounds, 207 N.Y. 671, 100 N.E. 1134 (1912);
Knoth v. Manhattan Ry., 187 N.Y. 243, 79 N.E. 1015 (1907); Pappenheim v. Metro-
politan El. Ry., 128 N.Y. 436, 28 N.E. 518 (1891). Most of these cases involve public
utility companies and started with the noted elevated railway cases.
7. See Wormser v. Brown, 149 N.Y. 163, 43 N.E. 524 (1896).
8. Also called the "balance of hardships" or "balance of conveniences" doctrine;
see 4 BROOKLYN L. REv. 71 (1934).
9. 239 App. Div. 324, 267 N.Y.S. 349 (2d Dep't 1933), aff'd, 264 N.Y. 98, 190 N.E.
163 (1934); see Kraatz v. Certain-Teed Products Corp., 20 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Sup. Ct. 1940);
Bentley v. Empire Portland Cement Co., 48 Misc. 457, 96 N.Y.S. 831 (1905).
10. Garber v. Ruble Corp., 160 Misc. 716, 290 N.Y.S. 633 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
11. 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913).
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for refusing an injunction."'12 Therefore, as a result of Whelan, where an
injury was not inherently slight or trivial, even assuming the injury was
small as compared with the loss to the defendant, an injunction would not
be denied.13 The converse of Whelan, that an injunction would be denied
that would cause great injury or inconvenience to a defendant while con-
ferring slight benefit to a plaintiff where his injury is non-substantial, has
also been true.14 In addition, through an extension of Whelan, injunctive
relief may be made conditional upon the defendant's abatement of a nuis-
ance. Where such relief is awarded, the court usually gives the defendant
an opportunity to correct the condition which causes the nuisance.15 Such
relief may also be made conditional upon the defendant's paying permanent
damages to the plaintiff.'0
In the instant case, the court overruled the Whelan doctrine that an
injunction would be granted whenever damage to the plaintiff is sub-
stantial.17 The court based its decision on the comparative injury exception
to the rule which allows injunctive relief as a matter of right, noting that
here injunctive relief would close the plant since no methods to eliminate
such nuisance had yet been developed nor would be developed in the near
future.'8 It characterized such relief as a "drastic remedy" in light of the
defendant's large investment and the number of persons employed.10 The
court concluded that the award of damages would do justice because it
fully compensates the litigants for their economic loss in property devalua-
tion,20 and that the payment of damages would be effective incentive for
12. Id. at 5, 101 N.E. at 806. While Whelan involves riparian rights rather than a
nuisance, analogous processes of balancing the equities, to determine whether an injunc-
tion should issue, are used in both situations. See Kennedy v. Moog Servocontrols, Inc.,
21 N.Y.2d 966, 237 N.E.2d 356, 290 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1968); Stroebel v. Kerr Salt Co.,
164 N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142 (1900).
13. In Spadafora v. Nolan Corp., 66 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup. Ct. 1946), the action was
to restrain defendants from using a factory building which adjoined plaintiff's residence
in such a manner as to produce offensive odors, noise, soot and vibrations to the injury
of the plaintiff's property. The conditions which caused the nuisance had already been
remedied; notwithstanding, temporary injunctive relief was granted.
14. E.g., Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., 244 N.Y. 22, 154 N.E. 652 (1926); McCann
v. Chasm Power Co., 211 N.Y. 301, 105 N.E. 416 (1914).
15. E.g., Hadcock v. Gloversville, 96 App. Div. 130, 89 N.Y.S. 74 (3d Dep't 1904).
'16. Ferguson v. Village of Hamburg, 272 N.Y. 234, 5 N.E.2d 801 (1936).
17. Whelan v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913).
18. 26 N.Y.2d at 225, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 317. It should be noted
that at the trial court, 55 Misc. 2d 1023, 287 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1967), the granting of
an injunction was precluded due to the defendant's immense investment in the Hudson
River Valley, its contribution to the Capital District's economy, and its immediate help
to the education of children in the town through the payment of substantial sums in
school and property taxes. The court, in so deciding, relied on McCann v. Chasm Power
Co., 211 N.Y. 301, 305, 105 N.E. 416, 417 (1916), which held that the right to an injunc-
tion is always discretionary.
19. 26 N.Y.2d at 225, 257 N.E2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
20. Id. at 226, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
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research to minimize nuisance.2 1 The majority based recovery of damages
on the theory of "servitude of land" imposed upon plaintiffs by defendant's
nuisance.22 In addition, the court reasoned that it should not attempt to
eliminate air pollution in a private dispute, since such an undertaking is
the responsibility of the legislature.23 It was emphasized that this remedy
does not foreclose "other public agencies from seeking proper relief in a
proper court."2
Justice Jasen, in his dissenting opinion, distinguished those cases which
awarded damages in lieu of an injunction as based upon the public benefit
exception to injunction as a matter of right.25 He concluded that the
cement company served its own private interest with no public benefit here.
In addition, he urged that it is not "constitutionally permissible to impose
servitude on land, without consent of the owner, by payment of permanent
damages where the impairment of land is for a private use."'26 Justice Jasen
further viewed the decision as compounding a serious health problem that
affects the general public by, in effect, licensing air pollution.2 7
Boomer has dearly overruled Whelan by denying the plaintiff an in-
junction where he has suffered substantial injury and awarding permanent
damages instead.2 8 The propriety of an injunction now rests upon the com-
parative injuries to the litigants and the extent of the public benefit in-
volved. If the injury to the defendant caused by the issuance of an injunc-
tion is far greater than the injury to the plaintiff caused by its denial, an
injunction will not issue. Similarly, if there is a large public interest in the
facility causing the nuisance, an injunction will not issue. The majority
bases its decision upon a balancing of the injuries while the dissenting
21. Id.
22. Id. at 228, 257 N.E.2d at 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 319. See also United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261, 262, 267 (1946).
23. 26 N.Y.2d at 223, 257 N.E.2d at 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
24. Id. at 226, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 317. See also Air Quality Act of
1967, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (Supp. IV 1967); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw §§ 1264-99 (McKinney
Supp. 1967). But cf. Reynolds Metal Co. v. Martin, 337 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1964), holding
that an action to abate a private nuisance is in no way precluded because of the over-
lapping applicability of an air pollution statute.
25. 26 N.Y.2d at 230, 257 N.E.2d at 876, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 321; see Ferguson v. Village
of Hamburg, 272 N.Y. 234, 5 N.E.2d 801 (1936); Schwartzenbach v. Oneonta Light &
Power Co., 144 App. Div. 884, 129 N.Y.S. 384 (3d Dep't 1911), aff'd on other grounds,
207 N.Y. 671, 100 N.E. 1134 (1913).
26. 26 N.Y.2d at 231, 257 N.E2d at 876, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 321; see Fifth Avenue Coach
Lines, Inc. v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 342, 183 N.E.2d 684, 229 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1962);
N.Y. CONsr. art. I, § 7(a).
27. "[Clement production has recently been identified as a significant source of
particulate contamination in the Hudson Valley." 26 N.Y.2d at 229, 257 N.E.2d at 876,
309 N.Y.S.2d at 320.
28. The damage in the instant case which was set at $185,000 at the trial court,
clearly comes within the meaning of substantial. In none of the previous cases had an
injunction been denied where the continuing nuisance caused substantial damages.
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justice rests his decision upon a lack of public benefit. However, the in-
juries that result in the instant case from the issuance of an injunction
touch upon both doctrines, while failing to satisfy either of them. The
public interest served by denying the issuance of an injunction is protecting
the employment of 300 people from the community.29 Certainly this is not
a public benefit analogous or equivalent to the public benefit in maintain-
ing a public utility company where the public benefit exception to in-
junction as a matter of right developed. 30 It is clearly an insufficient basis
for denying an injunction.31 The private interest served by denying the
issuance of an injunction is protecting the defendant's $45,000,000 invest-
ment. However, in order to deny an injunction where the injury that would
be caused by its issuance is upon private interests, the court must first
balance the hardships and conveniences to both parties.3 2 It should be
argued that the court cannot disregard the possible injury to the community
from pollution, that a use for residential purposes should be accorded
greater protection than a use for business, and that the pecuniary value of
the respective properties is never decisive. 33 If not, a doctrine of compara-
tive injury, followed to its logical conclusion, would always deprive the
small property owner of his rights in favor of the large corporate interest.
In the instant case, the pecuniary value of the defendant's investment was
compared to the pecuniary value of the plaintiff's damages, resulting in a
determination that an injunction would not issue upon the payment of
permanent damages.34 Using the doctrine of comparative injury to create a
"servitude in land" also raises the serious question of whether such a weigh-
ing system may cause an unconstitutional "taking" or condemnation by
private business with the assistance of the courts.s3r The granting of an in-
29. The majority considered this a factor in concluding that an injunction would
be a "drastic remedy." 26 N.Y.2d at 225, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 809 N.Y.S.2d at 316. Perhaps,
however, the court also considered the payment by defendant of substantial sums in
school and property taxes, as the trial court did, 55 Misc. 2d 1023, 238 N.Y.S.2d 112
(Sup. Ct. 1967). In either case the public benefit is a minimal one.
30. See cases cited note 6 supra.
31. It should be noted in connection with the public interest involved, that while
both the majority and the dissent talk about air pollution, the instant case is concerned
with the law of nuisance and not with the problem of air pollution.
32. See cases cited note 9 supra.
33. See McClintock, Discretion to Deny Injunction Against Trespass and Nuisance,
12 MINN. L. RaV. 565, 583 (1928).
34. The court also appears to have overlooked the fact that the defendant knew of
the plaintiff's presence when he commenced operations in 1962, as well as the probable
consequences of the contemplated action. 26 N.Y.2d at 231, 257 N.E.2d at 877, 309 N.Y.S.2d
at 322.
35. E.g., Pahl v. Ribero, 193 Cal. 2d 154, 14 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1961), where a court of
equity balances conveniences to determine that an injunction, otherwise warranted,
should be withheld; its action approaches an exercise of a right of eminent domain in
favor of a private person; see Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc. v. City of New York, 11
N.Y.2d 342, 183 N.E.2d 684, 229 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1962) ; N.Y. CONsr. art. 1, § 7 (a). Further
consideration of this constitutional issue is beyond the scope of this note.
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junction, in the instant case, should not have been denied, either upon the
showing of public benefit or upon a comparison of the injuries. As a result
of Boomer, in an effort to further weigh the hardships in their favor, future
litigants may have to commence an action before the defendant suffers a
large investment in the construction of the facility which threatens to be a
nuisance or employs persons from the community. 36 An action to enjoin
an anticipatory nuisance, in those cases where a subsequent action to enjoin
the actual nuisance would propose a "drastic remedy," 37 would prevent the
defendant's injuries and inconveniences and, therefore, preclude the result-
ing inequities of an injunction. The court will have to take cognizance of
the inequities raised by the overruling of Whalen and provide more affirma-
tive protection for the small property owner than Boomer seems to allow.
BRUCE V. WEITZEN
RETALIATORY EVICTIQN-STATUTE PRESCRIBING CRIMINAL PEN-
ALTIES FOR LANDLORD REPRISALS AGAINST TENANTS WHO REPORT VIOLATIONS
or HOUSING OR HEALTH LAWS HELD CONSTITUTIONAL
A tenant in a seven-family house registered several complaints with the
board of health relating to the condition of her premises. Subsequently,
the owner increased the complaining tenant's rent from $117.50 to $175.00
per month. Pursuant to the provisions of the New Jersey retaliatory eviction
statute, the State brought criminal charges against the landlord. The statute
stipulates that any person who takes or threatens to take a reprisal against
a tenant who makes reports of violations of the health or housing code, is
to be adjudged disorderly, and may be subject to the maximum penalty
of six months imprisonment and a $250.00 fine.2 The tenant testified that
36. See Spater, Noise and the Law, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 1377 (1965).
37. See 26 N.Y.2d at 225, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
I. Although the statute mentions "health or building codes," not specifically housing
codes, the term is included as a "law or regulation which has as its objective the regula-
tion of rental premises." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-92.1 (Supp. 1969).
2. The New Jersey retaliatory eviction statute in full provides:
Any person, firm or corporation or agent, officer or employee thereof who threatens to
or takes reprisals against any tenant for reporting or complaining of the existence or
belief of the existence of any health or building code violation, or a violation of any
other municipal ordinance or State law or regulation which has as its objective the
regulation of rental premises, to a public agency, is a disorderly person and shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $250.00, or by imprisonment for not more than
6 months or both.
In any action brought under this section the receipt of a notice to quit the rented
premises or any substantial alteration of the terms of tenancy without cause within
90 days after making a report or complaint or within 90 days after any proceeding
resulting from such report or complaint shall create a rebuttable presumption that
such notice or alteration is a reprisal against the tenant for making such report or
complaint.
N.J. STA:. ANN. § 2A:170-92.1 (Supp. 1969).
